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Abstract  
Labor export has been part of Vietnam’s socio-economic development strategy since 
the beginning of the doi moi era. Recent years, Vietnam has sent about 80,000 
workers abroad per year. Vietnam has become a major source country of unskilled 
foreign workers for high-income East Asian countries.  
However, in these receiving countries, the desertion rate among Vietnamese workers 
is quite high, compared with that for workers from other countries. This paper 
examines the impact of Korean and Japanese policies for receiving foreign workers 
applied to and implemented in Vietnam, as well as the impact of Vietnamese labor 
sending system, on the problem of runaway workers. 
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International Labor Migration in Vietnam 
and the Impact of Receiving Countries’ Policies 
 
Futaba Ishizuka 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 “Labor export” has been part of Vietnam’s socio-economic 
development strategy since the beginning of the doi moi era. Recently, 
Vietnam has sent about 80,000 workers abroad per year. Major destinations 
for Vietnamese workers include Taiwan, Malaysia, Korea, and Japan. 
Especially for high-income East Asian economies (i.e., Taiwan, Korea, and 
Japan), Vietnam has become a major source country of unskilled foreign 
workers.  
Receiving countries 1  share a common problem associated with 
Vietnamese workers—a high desertion rate compared with that for workers 
from other countries. Taiwan stopped receiving Vietnamese household 
workers and caregivers in 2005 due to the high desertion rate among these 
workers. For similar reasons, the Korean Ministry of Employment and Labor 
(MOEL) has refrained from renewing the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) for sending workers with the Vietnamese Ministry of Labor, Invalids 
and Social Affairs (MOLISA), which expired in August 2012. In Japan, where 
the total number of foreign workers (accepted as trainees or technical 
interns) is kept relatively low, and the problem of runaway foreign workers 
relatively minor, the desertion rate among Vietnamese workers is also quite 
high compared with that for workers of other nationalities.  
 Why, then, do Vietnamese migrant workers continually desert their 
contracts in the receiving countries? Have the concerned governments found 
an effective measure for containing this trend? This question is worth 
exploring not just because the runaway workers pose a threat to the law and 
order of the receiving countries (which, in turn, could lead to these 
governments rejecting Vietnamese workers). The problem of the high 
desertion rate reflects the various difficulties Vietnamese workers face 
throughout the labor migration process. 
 The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of major receiving 
                                                   
1 In this paper, Taiwan is referred to as a country. 
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countries’ policies for receiving foreign workers applied to and implemented 
in Vietnam, as well as the impact of the Vietnamese labor sending system, on 
the problem of runaway workers. Among the major receiving countries, 
Korea and Japan are the focus. For Vietnamese migrant workers, these 
countries are generally associated with the highest level of income and 
security in terms of work environment and legal protection. However, 
workers must meet certain technical skill or language requirements to be 
recruited in these countries, and the total number received is not as large as 
in Taiwan or Malaysia; thus, worker selection is competitive. Korea and 
Japan began recruiting Vietnamese workers in the early 1990s under similar 
“trainee” programs. 2  Since the Employment Permit System (EPS) was 
adopted in Korea, however, the two countries have taken different paths in 
terms of policies for receiving foreign workers, which are quite distinct from 
each other.  
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly 
reviews Vietnamese policies and institutions related to sending workers 
abroad and statistics on Vietnamese international labor migration in the 
past 20 years. Section 3 focuses on the problem of runaway Vietnamese 
workers in major receiving countries and domestic factors generally assumed 
to contribute to the high desertion rate among Vietnamese workers; and 
Korean and Japanese government foreign worker programs, how they 
attempt to deal with the problem of runaway workers, and program 
implementation in Vietnam. Section 4 summarizes the findings and 
considers the implications of the two countries’ experiences. 
 
2. Overview of international labor migration in Vietnam  
2.1. Labor export policy and legislation 
Vietnam started sending unskilled workers abroad via licensed 
agencies in November 1991, when the government issued Decree 370 on the 
regulation to send Vietnamese workers abroad to work for a fixed period. The 
decree established the mechanism by which licensed economic organizations 
(enterprises) play a central role in sending Vietnamese workers abroad, from 
exploring overseas “markets” for workers and securing contracts with foreign 
                                                   
2 Under these programs, “trainees” are officially treated differently from “workers.” For 
the discussions in this paper, however, sending trainees to Korea or Japan under these 
programs is regarded as a form of sending workers abroad.  
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employers to recruiting, training, and dispatching workers, in exchange for 
regulated fees paid by the workers.  
In the 1980s, Vietnam sent hundreds of thousands unskilled workers 
mainly to several socialist nations and the Middle East. However, the 
mechanism then was primarily government-led: the Department for 
International Labor Cooperation (DILACO) under the Ministry of Labor 
negotiated labor cooperation agreements with foreign governments and was 
responsible for implementing the agreements. This system ended when the 
socialist bloc disintegrated at the turn of the decade.  
Labor export has been an important socio-economic development 
policy of the Party and the government in doi moi–era Vietnam. Promoting 
labor export has repeatedly been mentioned in the policy documents adopted 
by the Party Congresses every five years since 1991. In 1998, the Politburo 
issued Directive 41-CT/TW on labor export. The document regards labor 
export as an “important and long-term strategy,” which contributes to 
developing the workforce needed for nation building in the age of 
industrialization and modernization. Expanding labor export, diversifying 
its forms and markets, increasing the share of high-quality workers of the 
total number of workers sent abroad, and protecting the rights of Vietnamese 
migrant workers are among the major labor export policies provided in 
Directive 41.  
The corresponding legal framework governing labor export has been 
developed. Decree 370 was renewed three times by 2003 (Decree 07 in 1995, 
Decree 152 in 1999, and Decree 81 in 2003), and in 2006, the Law on 
Vietnamese migrant workers was passed by the National Assembly. The Law 
consists of 80 articles in eight chapters. Compared with the preceding Decree 
81, which had 37 articles in seven chapters, a new chapter on “Teaching of 
Jobs and Foreign Languages and Provision of Necessary Knowledge” 
(Chapter IV) was added, and provisions on the organization and activities of 
enterprises sending migrant workers abroad (hereinafter, sending agencies), 
contracts and related fees, guarantees for migrant workers, and policies 
regarding workers after they returned home were expanded or newly added. 
Overall, if properly implemented, the new Law is expected to contribute to 
better protection of the rights of Vietnamese migrant workers. 
Related legal documents are aimed specially to enable the poor to 
participate in labor export. The State Bank Governor’s Decision 365 in 2004 
4 
 
allows the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies to extend preferential loans to 
migrant workers from poor households. Commercial banks are also 
authorized to lend up to 20 million dong without collateral to migrant 
workers from rural areas. The Prime Minister’s Decision 71 in 2009 
approved “the project supporting poor districts in promoting labor export for 
sustainable poverty reduction in the period 2009-2020.” The project aims to 
send abroad nearly 120,000 workers from 61 poor districts nationwide 
between 2009 and 2020. Poor or ethnic minority workers from those poor 
districts will be fully funded by the state budget for the costs associated with 
becoming migrant workers, including fees for training, accommodation and 
traveling, and completing necessary procedures.3  
 
2.2. Major actors involved in labor export 
2.2.1. The Department of Overseas Labor (DOLAB) and other institutions 
under MOLISA 
MOLISA is in charge of the state management of labor export. 
Within MOLISA, DOLAB, the successor to DILACO in the 1980s, conducts 
assessments for granting or withdrawing labor export licenses, audits and 
inspects labor export activities, and deals with violations of related 
provisions, as well as conducts research and advises the Ministry on 
strategies, plans, and legislation involving labor export.  
In addition, MOLISA has established the Overseas Worker Center 
(OWC), a public service unit attached to the Ministry primarily in charge of 
sending Vietnamese workers to Korea under the EPS. In 2012, DOLAB 
opened the Migration Resource Center (MRC) in Hanoi, a pilot initiative 
supported by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The MRC 
provides accurate information and support services to prospective and 
returning Vietnamese migrant workers.  
MOLISA also has two state-owned enterprises (SOEs) licensed to 
conduct labor export business under its management. 
 
                                                   
3 According to a recent newspaper article, implementation of this project is facing 
serious problems (“Ho tro huyen ngheo xuat khau lao dong (Supporting poor districts to 
export labor)”, Tuoi Tre, 4 March 2013). Nearly 7,500 workers from 56 poor districts 
were sent to Malaysia or the Middle East under the project in the 3 years since 2009. 
Many of these migrant workers returned or were deported prematurely, and thus were 
left owing bank loans they had borrowed to pay pre-departure costs.  
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2.2.2. Sending agencies 
According to the current provisions, a sending agency must be a 
100% Vietnamese enterprise with legal capital of at least 5 billion dong 
(about US$250,000). Previously, labor export services were monopolized by 
enterprises owned by the state or certain mass organizations, but the Law on 
Vietnamese migrant workers and the implementation decree expanded the 
range of eligible enterprises to include domestic private firms.  
To be granted a license, an enterprise must have a program for 
sending workers abroad, a specialized section that provides pre-departure 
training to workers, and an administrative leader who has a university or 
higher degree and has at least three years of experience in labor export or 
international cooperation, and must have paid a deposit of 1 billion dong 
(about US$50,000). A licensed sending agency may have its license revoked 
in cases such as failing to meet any of these conditions, failing to send 
workers abroad within 12 months after being licensed, 4  or violating 
provisions on prohibited acts listed in the Law (such as sending workers to 
dangerous areas or making workers engage in hazardous activities).  
According to a Supervisory Report of the Standing Committee of the 
National Assembly, as of the end of June 2010, there were 167 sending 
agencies in Vietnam (UBTVQH [2010]). Of the 167 sending agencies, 30 are 
100% private enterprises, 39 are joint-stock companies in which the state 
owns up to 50%, and 98 are SOEs (including 100% state-owned enterprises 
and joint-stock companies in which the state holds the majority share). In 
1992, 37 enterprises were initially licensed under Decree 370. By 1998, the 
number had increased to 59. After Politburo Directive 41 was issued, the 
number of licensed enterprises increased rapidly, and there were 168 
sending agencies as of May 2001. Since then, throughout the 2000s, there 
have been no large fluctuations in the number of sending agencies.  
Many of the sending agencies operate on a relatively small scale. 
According to the Supervisory Report of the Standing Committee of the 
National Assembly (UBTVQH [2010]), only 17 of the 167 enterprises send 
1,000 or more workers abroad per year, and up to 52 enterprises send fewer 
than 100 workers abroad per year. This may be related, at least partly, to the 
fact that the majority of sending agencies provide labor export services as a 
sideline. According to the same report, only 18 out of 167 enterprises 
                                                   
4 In practice, however, this provision has never been applied. 
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specialize in sending workers abroad. The report points out that those 
multi-sector enterprises tend to pay insufficient attention to their labor 
export section, which may lead to problems such as relying on illegal brokers 
or failing to comply with the requirements related to labor supply contracts.  
 
2.2.3. Branches of sending agencies, brokers, and local governments 
According to the Law on Vietnamese migrant workers, sending 
agencies must recruit workers directly without collecting recruitment fees. 
To facilitate services, sending agencies may assign up to three branches in 
three provinces part of the agency’s labor export services. More specifically, 
branches are not allowed to sign labor supply contracts or migrant worker 
contracts, or collect service or brokerage fees5 and deposits from workers 
without the enterprise’s authorization. In practice, however, the process of 
recruiting migrant workers is generally highly complex and multi-layered, 
involving various organizations and individuals.  
Sending agencies may have up to three branches, but these branches 
also set up “centers.” Some sending agencies even do not explore foreign 
partners, check labor supply contracts, and recruit workers themselves, but 
allow their branches and centers to perform all substantive work without 
much supervision. Brokers are also widely involved. According to the 
Supervisory Report of the National Assembly Standing Committee, in some 
of the communes visited by the Supervision Mission, 70-80% of the workers 
had been recruited via brokers, and not recruited directly by sending 
agencies. Sending agencies that have partners in high-income countries in 
particular rarely come to local communities to recruit workers (UBTVQH 
[2010, 9]).  
According to the Law on Vietnamese migrant workers, sending 
agencies are required to notify the provincial Departments of Labor, Invalids 
and Social Affairs (DOLISAs) when recruiting workers in the respective 
localities, and regularly report to the departments recruitment results and 
the number of workers sent abroad. However, in practice, local governments 
are often involved in the recruitment process more directly. A sending agency 
often requests local governments, especially district authorities, and/or their 
                                                   
5 A service fee is an amount paid by a worker to a sending agency for its services related 
to a migrant worker contract. A brokerage fee is an amount a sending agency pays a 
mediator (if any) to secure a labor supply contract, which the sending agency can get 
refunded by a worker. 
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employment introduction centers, to collect applications and conduct the 
initial screening. Once a certain number of workers are registered, the 
sending agency sends its staff to make the final selection (Wang and 
Belanger [2011, 320], Odaka [2000, 66-67]). Against this backdrop, there 
have been reports of alleged corruption involving local government officials 
or employment introduction centers in relation to labor export.6  
 
2.2.4. Vietnam Association of Manpower Supply (VAMAS) 
VAMAS is an association of sending agencies established by a 
decision of the Minister of Internal Affairs in 2003. Although membership is 
voluntary, VAMAS boasts 136 members including all major players. 
Currently, the chairman of VAMAS is a former vice minister of MOLISA. 
According to the association’s statute, the purpose of VAMAS is to 
coordinate and liaise between sending agencies and concerned offices, 
organizations, and individuals and to support member enterprises in 
improving knowledge, conducting research, proposing measures for dealing 
with labor export problems, and effectively helping each other, so that all 
members can develop equally and the rights and interests of the members 
are protected. VAMAS activities include promoting information 
dissemination and exchange through issuing newsletters, supporting 
member enterprises’ employee training, and advising on conflicts arising in 
labor export. 
In 2010, VAMAS cooperated with ILO to formulate a Code of Conduct 
(CoC) for sending agencies based on Vietnamese laws and international labor 
standards. A scheme for evaluating sending agencies’ compliance with the 
CoC was also promulgated in 2012. The evaluation is based on information 
collected from various parties, including the media, workers and their 
families, other sending agencies, local government agencies, and concerned 
organizations in receiving countries. This scheme is applied to 20 enterprises 
on a trial basis for the first year and then will be expanded to cover all 
member enterprises. 
 
2.3. International labor migration trends in Vietnam 
2.3.1. General profile 
                                                   
6 “Nghi van tu Trung tam gioi thieu viec lam Nam Dinh (Suspicion from Nam Dinh 
Employment Introduction Center)”, Dec 08 2011, VOV online, for instance. 
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 Vietnam sent only about 1,000 workers abroad per year at the 
beginning of the 1990s, but the number of Vietnamese migrant workers 
subsequently steadily increased (Table 1). The increase in the number of 
migrant workers was most significant from the end of the 1990s to the first 
half of the 2000s. Between 1991 and 2000, Vietnam sent more than 120,000 
workers abroad; between 2001 and 2010, the number exceeded 700,000. In 
2012 alone, the country sent more than 80,000 workers abroad.7  
 
Table 1. Number of migrant workers by major destination, 1992-2010   
      (Unit: Person) 
  Korea Japan Taiwan Malaysia 
Africa and the 
Middle East 
Other Total 
1992 56  210  0  0  - - 816  
1993 1,352  285  0  0  - - 3,976  
1994 4,378  257  37  0  - - 9,234  
1995 5,674  723  87  0  - - 10,050  
1996 6,275  1,343  122  0  - - 12,661  
1997 4,880  2,250  191  0  - - 18,469  
1998 1,322  1,926  196  7  - - 12,197  
1999 6,029  2,530  3,969  1  - - 21,810  
2000 7,316  1,497  8,099  239  34  14,315  31,500  
2001 3,910  3,249  7,782  23  1,094  20,110  36,168  
2002 1,190  2,202  13,191  19,965  408  9,166  46,122  
2003 4,336  2,256  29,069  38,227  750  362  75,000  
2004 4,779  2,752  37,144  14,567  938  7,267  67,447  
2005 12,102  2,955  22,784  24,605  1,276  6,872  70,594  
2006 10,577  5,360  14,127  37,941  5,246  5,604  78,855  
2007 12,187  5,517  23,640  26,704  6,184  10,788  85,020  
2008 18,141  6,142  31,631  7,810  11,113  12,153  86,990  
2009 7,578  5,456  21,677  2,792  16,083  19,442  73,028  
2010 8,628  4,913  28,499  11,741  10,888  20,877  85,546  
Total 120,710  51,823  242,245  184,622  - - 825,483  
Source: Consular Department, MOFA [2012, 16], Ishizuka [2002], Choi[2010]  
 
 The ratio of the number of jobs created through labor export to the 
number of jobs created in-country also increased from 2.4% in 2000 to 5.4% 
in 2008 (Luu Van Hung [2011, 138]). The remittances sent by Vietnamese 
migrant workers are estimated to total about US$2 billion per year in recent 
                                                   
7 These figures represent “official” flows of international labor migration. It is 
estimated that there is substantial “unofficial” labor migration to neighboring countries 
such as Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and (to a lesser extent) the Yunnan province of 
China, but no reliable data on such flows are available (Nguyen Thi Kim Dung and Cu 
Chi Loi [2012], Nguyen Thi My Van [2010]).  
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years and about US$1.7 billion on average between 2003 and 2009.8  
Regarding the destination of Vietnamese migrant workers, 75% of 
the workers sent abroad between 2000 and 2010 went to the four east and 
southeast Asian countries: Taiwan, Malaysia, Korea, and Japan. In terms of 
the field of work, between 1996 and 2007, nearly 60% of Vietnamese migrant 
workers were employed in manufacturing, followed by services (including 
domestic workers and caregivers: 21%), construction (10%), and fishery (5%) 
(Luu Van Hung [2011, 144]). Female workers made up about 30% of 
Vietnamese migrant workers between 1992 and 2009. The share of female 
workers is relatively high in Taiwan and Malaysia. In the following, features 
of each major destination country are provided. 
 
2.3.2. Features of major destination countries 
a. Japan 
 Japan has been receiving Vietnamese workers since 1992, mainly 
under the Japanese Industrial Training Program (ITP) and the Technical 
Internship Program (TIP). The total number of Vietnamese workers sent to 
Japan between 1992 and 2010 was relatively small (about 52,000), but the 
annual intake has increased to about 5,000 or more in recent years. 
Regarding trainees/technical interns (hereinafter, trainees) supported by the 
Japan International Training Cooperation Organization (JITCO), 9  the 
number of Vietnamese trainees in the 1990s was fewer than Chinese, 
Indonesian, Philippine, and Thai trainees; in recent years, the number of 
Vietnamese trainees is only second to Chinese (although the Vietnamese 
share of the total JITCO-supported trainees is only 8.5%, much smaller than 
that of Chinese who account for about 80% of the total).  
 According to a survey conducted by the Institute of labor Sciences 
and Social Affairs (ILSSA), a research institute under MOLISA, Vietnamese 
                                                   
8 UBTVQH [2010, 5], “Lao dong lam viec o nuoc ngoai moi nam gui ve nuoc 1,7 ti USD 
(Migrant workers send home US$ 1.7 billion every year)”, An Ninh Thu Do, 01 February 
2010. 
9 JITCO mainly supports trainees accepted by small and medium enterprises through 
enterprise associations (“primary accepting organizations” or “supervising 
organizations”) such as business cooperatives or chambers of commerce. There are other 
types of foreign trainees such as the ones accepted by government agencies like JICA, or 
accepted directly by enterprises that have subsidiaries or counterparts in foreign 
countries. JITCO-supported trainees made up 58% of the total number of foreign 
trainees who entered Japan in 2010. 
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workers who returned from Japan between 2004 and 2011 could, on average, 
save US$14,800 after three years’ work, the highest among the four major 
destination countries.10 However, to be selected to become a trainee in Japan, 
workers are generally required to meet relatively high technical standards. 
MOLISA statistics show that up to 80% of workers sent to Japan between 
1996 and 2006 had high-level technical skills (“high-level technical skills 
(lanh nghe, trinh do cao)” is not clearly defined, however) (Luu Van Hung 
[2011, 141]). 
 In Japan, Vietnamese trainees are mainly employed in the 
manufacturing (machinery/metals, textiles/garments, food, etc.), 
construction, agriculture, and fishery sectors. 
 
b. Korea 
 Korea normalized relations with Vietnam in 1992, and started 
receiving Vietnamese workers. In the beginning, Vietnamese workers were 
received mainly through the “Industrial Trainee” Program (started in 1993), 
which was similar to the Japanese ITP/TIP. Korea accepted nearly 30,000 
Vietnamese workers in the 1990s, and thus during that period was the 
largest receiving country. After the EPS was implemented in 2005, the 
number of Vietnamese workers sent to Korea per year increased further: the 
annual average of the number of Vietnamese workers entering Korea has 
reached 10,000. Of the 15 sending countries designated under the EPS, 
Vietnam has sent the largest number of workers to Korea under the scheme 
(about 63,000 by mid-2011). Korea accepted a total of about 120,000 
Vietnamese workers between 1992 and 2010. 
 According to the ILSSA report, Vietnamese workers returning from 
Korea between 2004 and 2011 could, on average, save US$11,500 after three 
years’ work. Under the EPS, a foreign worker may legally stay and work in 
Korea for up to four years and 10 months and, under certain conditions, may 
be recruited for a second term (which means a worker may work in Korea for 
up to nearly 10 years at the longest). In that sense, a worker may expect 
higher total remuneration by working in Korea than working in Japan, 
where the maximum duration is three years without a second chance. 
 To work in Korea, a Vietnamese worker must pass the Test of 
Proficiency in Korean (EPS-TOPIK) administered by the Human Resources 
                                                   
10 “Labour exports not plain sailing”, Vietnam Investment Review, 20 July 2012. 
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Development Service of Korea (HRD Korea) and the OWC. In Korea, nearly 
90% of Vietnamese migrant workers are employed in factories, and the 
remainder work in the agriculture, construction, and fishery sectors 
(Consular Department, MOFA [2012, 23]). 
 
c. Taiwan 
 Taiwan officially started receiving Vietnamese workers in late 1999. 
Right after that, the number of Vietnamese workers sent to Taiwan 
increased rapidly. More than 240,000 Vietnamese workers were sent to 
Taiwan between 1992 and 2010, the largest among the four major receiving 
countries.  
 As of October 2012, there are about 100,000 Vietnamese migrant 
workers in Taiwan; they account for 22% of the total foreign workforce. Thus, 
Vietnam ranks second (after Indonesia) among the six sending countries in 
terms of the number of workers sent to Taiwan. About 80% of Vietnamese 
migrant workers are employed in the manufacturing sector (metals, 
machinery/equipment, plastic, electronics, textiles, food, etc.), and about 20% 
are employed in domestic and care work. Up to 43% of Vietnamese migrant 
workers in Taiwan are female. 
 According to the ILSSA survey, a Vietnamese migrant worker who 
returned from Taiwan between 2004 and 2011 could, on average, save 
US$6,900 after three years’ work. In addition to the generally lower wages in 
the manufacturing sector compared with those in Korea or Japan, the 
relatively low average income of migrant workers in Taiwan is likely because 
the minimum wage is not applied to domestic workers and caregivers. 
However, the technical or educational standards migrant workers are 
required to meet are not as high.  
 The industrial accident rate among Vietnamese migrant workers is 
high in Taiwan (Table 2), which suggests that working conditions for many 
migrant workers are poor. In addition, the actual duration of work for 
Vietnamese migrant workers in Taiwan is rather short, compared with those 
in Korea or Japan. The ILSSA survey showed that 13% and 14% of 
Vietnamese workers in Korea and Japan, respectively, were employed for 
only 35 months or less, whereas in Taiwan, the figure was 37%. Belanger et 
al. [2010, 45] observed similar patterns among their sample and noted that 
the most frequently cited reason for early return from Taiwan was “poor 
12 
 
working conditions.”  
 
Table 2. Number of industrial accidents and deaths of Vietnamese migrant workers by major destination, 
2006-2008 
       (Unit: Person) 
  Industrial accidents Deaths 
  2006 2007 2008 Total 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Japan 2 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 
Korea 0 12 3 15 10 11 2 23 
Taiwan 215 296 0 511 20 9 4 33 
Malaysia 231 274 95 600 97 111 49 257 
Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The Middle East 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 4 
Total 448 583 98 1129 127 134 56 317 
Source: Luu Van Hung [2011, 313]       
Note: The figure for 2008 is based on data from January through August 2008.    
 
d. Malaysia 
 Malaysia officially began accepting Vietnamese workers after the 
governments of the two countries signed a bilateral agreement on labor 
cooperation in late 2003. Although the level of annual intake of Vietnamese 
workers has fluctuated, depending on policy changes or economic 
fluctuations, in terms of the total number of Vietnamese migrant workers 
between 1992 and 2010, Malaysia ranks second among the four major 
receiving countries, by accepting more than 180,000 Vietnamese workers.  
 As of 2008, about 103,000 Vietnamese migrant workers were 
employed in Malaysia. Vietnam is the sixth largest provider of registered 
foreign workers to Malaysia (after Indonesia, Bangladesh, Nepal, India, and 
Myanmar). Up to 92% of these Vietnamese migrant workers are employed in 
the manufacturing sector, and the remainder work in such sectors as 
construction (4%) and services (3%) (Abella and Ducanes [2011, 29]).  
 The ILSSA survey showed that a Vietnamese worker who returned 
from Malaysia between 2004 and 2011 could, on average, save US$2,400 
after three years’ work. Although the income level is low, a worker does not 
need to be highly skilled to work in Malaysia. In addition, the regulated fees 
and charges workers must pay to sending agencies are also low, which 
facilitates the poor’s participation in labor export.  
 In Malaysia, as in Taiwan, the industrial accident rate among 
Vietnamese workers is high, and the death rate in particular is noticeably 
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high (Table 2). The proportion of early returns (38%) is also high, as in the 
case of Taiwan, whereas the major reason for early return from Malaysia is 
“salary-related problems” such as insufficient salary. However, the desertion 
rate among Vietnamese workers in Malaysia is not high compared with those 
in other major receiving countries (Table 3). 
 In recent years, the number of Vietnamese workers sent to Malaysia 
has been declining, reportedly because fewer workers prefer to work in the 
country due to the low level of income or risks such as abuse or job 
termination.11 
 
3. Problem of runaway workers and Korea’s and Japan’s response 
3.1. Problem of runaway workers and the domestic factors 
Table 3 shows the number of runaway Vietnamese workers and the 
desertion rates in the major receiving countries between 1996 and 2007, 
based on MOLISA figures (cited in Luu Van Hung [2011, 314]).12  
 
Table 3. Number of Vietnamese runaway workers by major destination, 1996-2007 
      (Unit: Person) 
  Korea Japan Taiwan Malaysia Africa 
The 
Middle 
East 
Total 
Number of runaway 
workers 
15,761  546  29,995  576  0  0  31,117  
Desertion rate 21.0% 1.6% 18.7% 0.4% - - - 
Source: Prepared by the author based on Luu Van Hung [2011, 314]       
Note: The desertion rate is calculated by dividing the number of runaway workers by the number of 
migrant workers (1996-2007) in Table 1. 
 
Information on more recent conditions in the major receiving 
countries except Malaysia is provided below. 
Taiwan stopped accepting Vietnamese domestic workers in January 
2005, as reportedly up to 45% of these workers had deserted their contracts. 
However, recent media reports suggest the problem is continuing and even 
getting worse. According to a newspaper article published in April 2012, the 
number of Vietnamese runaway workers has increased since 2003 and 
                                                   
11 “Nguoi lao dong quay lung voi thi truong Malaysia (Workers turn their back on 
Malaysian market)”, Tuoi Tre, 10 April 2012. 
12 In this paper, “desertion rate” (or runaway rate) is calculated by dividing the number 
of entries by the number of desertions in a year or a period. When figures from reports 
or newspaper articles are used, however, this definition may not apply. 
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reached 6,600 persons per year.13 To deal with this situation, DOLAB issued 
the Official Letter 341 of 15 February 2012, which sets the maximum 
pre-departure cost for Vietnamese workers sent to Taiwan, among other 
things.  
The situation in Korea is no less serious. According to a newspaper 
report published in October 2012, nearly 23,000 Vietnamese are working 
illegally in Korea, of whom more than 11,000 entered the country under the 
EPS.14 In 2012, the rate of Vietnamese workers overstaying their contracts 
in Korea reached about 50%, which was much higher than the average rate 
of overstay among all EPS workers (21%).15 The Korean government had 
expressed concerns over the high runaway rate among Vietnamese workers, 
but the situation got worse instead of better. Accordingly, the Korean 
government has withheld renewal of the MOU with the Vietnamese 
government, which expired at the end of August 2012. 
In Japan, the number of JITCO-supported Vietnamese trainees who 
ran away was 241 in 2010, and 936 in the period 2007-2010, which seems 
relatively small compared with the figures in Taiwan and Korea. However, 
the annual average of the desertion rate of Vietnamese trainees in 2007-2010 
was 7.6%, which is much higher than the desertion rate of the total 
JITCO-supported trainees (2.4%) and the highest among the major sending 
countries. 
The problem of runaway workers is a challenge for the Vietnamese 
government that may impede efforts to promote labor export. On the other 
hand, the high rate of desertion can also be seen, at least partly, as a result of 
difficulties that Vietnamese migrant workers often face at home and abroad.  
One major domestic factor contributing to the high desertion rate 
among Vietnamese migrant workers is the high pre-departure cost. 
According to Belanger et al. [2010], the average pre-departure costs for 
                                                   
13 “Nguy co Dai Loan han che tiep nhan lao dong VN (Taiwan threatens to limit the 
acceptance of Vietnamese workers”, Tuoi Tre, 7 April 2012. 
14 “Han quoc ngung tiep nhan lao dong Viet Nam (Korea suspends the acceptance of 
Vietnamese workers)”, Tuoi Tre, 5 October 2012. 
15 “Bo truong Pham Thi Hai Chuyen tra loi viec Han Quoc thong bao tam ngung tuyen 
lao dong Viet Nam (Response of Minister Pham Thi Hai Chuyen on the issue of Korea’s 
announcement on temporary suspension of recruitment of Vietnamese workers)”, 
downloaded from MOLISA website 
(http://www.molisa.gov.vn/news/detail/tabid/75/newsid/55964/seo/Bo-truong-Pham-Thi-
Hai-Chuyen-tra-loi-viec-Han-Quoc-thong-bao-tam-ngung-tuyen-lao-dong-Viet-Nam/lan
guage/vi-VN/Default.aspx), on 10 December 2012 
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workers sent to Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia between 2006 and 2008 
were as high as some 15 times as much as the average income of these 
workers in the respective countries.16 The survey also found that nearly all 
respondents had to borrow money to pay the pre-departure costs. Overall, 
the workers had to borrow the equivalent of nearly the full amount of the 
costs. Thus, the high pre-departure costs and resulting heavy debts owed by 
the workers are seen as a major factor driving migrant workers to abandon 
their contracts to take up better-paid illegal employment and/or overstay in 
the receiving countries.  
Second, many migrant workers are unemployed when they return 
home. The ILSSA survey shows that up to 76% of migrant workers could not 
find a job after returning to Vietnam. Belanger et al. [2010] also found 
approximately 20% of the returnees had a job after their return, while the 
majority of the rest could not find a job (the remainder did not work for other 
reasons). The Law on Vietnamese migrant workers has provisions for 
employment support for returning workers. However, in practice, local 
governments generally do not have policies supporting returnees or do not 
even know the number of returnees. This situation is also thought to drive 
more migrant workers to choose to overstay their contracts illegally. 
In other cases, sending agencies do not function properly, which 
results in gaps between workers’ expectations and reality. Sending agencies 
do not always provide workers with correct and adequate information on 
labor supply contracts, either intentionally or unintentionally. For instance, 
Belanger et al. [2010, 22] found that about 7% of respondents had signed 
more than one contract, and some even did not sign a contract. 
These major factors are generally seen as affecting the high desertion 
rate of Vietnamese migrant workers.17 In the following, we look more closely 
at the mechanisms for sending Vietnamese workers to Korea and Japan, and 
examine how official and actual sending/receiving mechanisms between 
Vietnam and these countries have affected the problem of runaway workers, 
                                                   
16 Income figures are the average of the period 2000-2009. 
17 Besides, it is sometimes pointed out that Vietnamese workers’ lack of labor discipline 
and low legal consciousness are also to be blamed. For instance, see “Giai phap ngan 
chan tinh trang lao dong xuat khau bo tron (Solutions to prevent migrant workers from 
running away)”, 
http://www.molisa.gov.vn/news/detail2/tabid/371/newsid/53866/seo/Giai-phap-ngan-cha
n-tinh-trang-lao-dong-xuat-khau-bo-tron/language/vi-VN/Default.aspx, downloaded 
from the MOLISA website on 10 December 2012. 
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and vice versa. 
 
3.2. The case of Korea 
3.2.1. Korea’s foreign worker policy 
Korea has changed from a labor-exporting country to a 
labor-importing country within a rather short period, due to rapid economic 
growth since the 1960s. Facing the problem of a labor shortage especially in 
manufacturing, the Korean government introduced the Industrial Trainee 
Program in 1993, which enabled small and medium enterprises to employ 
foreigners for manual labor. However, the Industrial Trainee Program led to 
the emergence of a large number of illegal foreign workers in Korea. At the 
root of the problem was the “trainee” status of industrial trainees, which 
made them ineligible for legal labor rights, including the minimum wage. 
The low wage and the lack of legal protection, together with the high 
brokerage fees resulting from slack management of the recruitment process, 
were blamed for making illegal work more attractive for trainees. After 
trying many remedial measures to deal with system deficiencies, the 
government fundamentally changed its foreign worker policy and adopted 
the EPS. The EPS was first implemented in 2004: In the beginning, the EPS 
coexisted with the Industrial Trainee Program, but the latter was integrated 
in the former in 2007. 
As can be seen from the background of the EPS, protecting the rights 
of foreign workers is one of the main objectives of the EPS. Under the EPS, a 
migrant worker is treated the same as a local worker, and any unreasonable 
discrimination based on his or her nationality is clearly prohibited. Workers 
and employers are required to subscribe to various types of insurance, 
including insurance that covers casualties and unpaid wages. If a migrant 
worker is unable to continue working at his or her original workplace for 
unforeseen reasons (such as the enterprise going out of business), the worker 
can change workplaces up to three times within three years, in principle. 
The EPS is also characterized by adopting simple and transparent 
procedures for recruiting migrant workers, to prevent bad business practices 
during the recruitment process. The Korean government signs an MOU with 
the sending country’s government, in which the principles and standards for 
recruiting workers are specified. The MOU is renewed based on the 
assessment of MOU implementation. Only the governments and public 
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organizations are involved in recruiting and placing migrant workers on the 
sending and receiving sides, and private agencies are officially excluded from 
the procedures. The primary criterion for selecting workers is the 
EPS-TOPIK score. Only workers who pass this examination are put on the 
job-seekers’ roster and can sign a labor contract with employers that have 
obtained the workers’ profiles through the Employment Stability Center. The 
total costs incurred by migrant workers during the recruitment process are 
also made public. 
Under the EPS, the Korean government also provides support to 
returning workers so they can find employment at home smoothly. A “happy 
return program” enables workers close to the end of their contract in Korea 
to take free-of-charge training courses on skills useful for finding 
employment or starting a business back home. The Korean government also 
matches returnees and Korean businesses in the workers’ home countries.  
 
3.2.2. EPS implementation in Vietnam 
The EPS is generally seen as successful in addressing major 
problems of the Industrial Trainee Program, such as the high pre-departure 
costs for migrant workers and the high desertion rate, at least to some 
degree. The system has a good reputation in the international community. In 
2011, the EPS was awarded first place in the United Nations Public Service 
Awards (UNPSA) in the “preventing and combating corruption in the public 
service” category. 
However, the EPS seems least effective in preventing Vietnamese 
workers from becoming illegal. What, then, are the reasons for such 
ineffectiveness? 
The Korean MOEL signed the first MOU with MOLISA in 2004. 
MOLISA started to organize worker recruitment somewhat similarly to the 
practice under the labor cooperation agreements with advanced socialist 
countries in the 1980s. MOLISA allocated part of the “quota” for recruiting 
workers to vocational training institutions under the central ministries and 
the rest to localities (provinces). In addition, in worker selection, priority was 
given to workers from poor families and families of those who had rendered 
great service to the revolution, or those disabled during the war.  
After the EPS-TOPIK was implemented in Vietnam in 2006, a 
pre-test at the local level was introduced to limit the number of applicants in 
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each round of the EPS-TOPIK conducted at the center. The OWC explained 
that too many applicants would overwhelm test management at the central 
level, and the failure of a large number of applicants would cause great 
dissatisfaction (Choi [2010, 249]).  
Under this system, unofficial brokerage continued to exist in 
different forms. A worker who wants to work in Korea should register at the 
local labor office and learn Korean at the provincial foreign language center 
(or a designated private foreign language center). After obtaining a 
certificate for completing a three-month program, the worker should take the 
pre-test in Korean. If the worker passes the pre-test, he or she is qualified to 
take the EPS-TOPIK. If the worker passes the EPS-TOPIK, then he or she 
receives a Korean language proficiency certificate and waits to be recruited 
by a Korean employer within two years (the certificate is valid for two years). 
Brokers help applicants through each stage until they arrive in Korea. 
Applicants pay brokers unofficial brokerage fees ranging from US$5,000 to 
$14,000, which is divided among “clues,” key agents and people involved in 
each stage of the recruitment process, including local People’s Committees, 
local labor offices, Korean language institutions, and central institutions 
such as MOLISA and OWC (Choi [2010, 258]).  
Preferential treatment for a certain group of workers such as the 
poor was abolished in 2008, as was the local-level pre-test in 2010, 
apparently in an effort to ensure transparency in the sending process. The 
Korea-Vietnam MOU was renewed in 2008 and 2010, and these policy 
changes likely were realized as a result of requests from the Korean side 
during the MOU renewal negotiations. The effect of the abolishment of the 
pre-test in 2010 is visible in a sharp increase in the ratio of the number of 
applicants to the number of qualifiers in the EPS-TOPIK (Table 4). In the 5th 
EPS-TOPIK, the ratio was about 1.06; from the 6th to the 9th, the ratio 
increased to 2.88 on average. 
 
Table 4. Number of applicants and qualifiers in the EPS-TOPIK 
   
        
(Unit: Person) 
  
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 
(2006) (2006) (2007) (2007) (2008) (2010) (2010) (2010) (2011) 
Applicants 9,424 8,127 8,189 8,221 14,661 30,571 27,567 8,056 66,773 
Qualifiers 6,489 5,121 7,924 8,082 13,878 10,678 15,395 3,387 14,937 
Source: Hanoi EPS Center, HRD Korea 
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Although the recruitment process seems to have become more 
competitive since the pre-test was abolished, the runaway worker problem 
has not been solved. In August 2012, MOLISA and the Korean Embassy in 
Vietnam co-organized a conference on Korea-Vietnam labor cooperation. A 
major topic of the conference was how to tackle Vietnamese worker desertion. 
At the conference, measures such as suspending migrant worker recruiting 
in localities with a high rate of illegal workers in Korea, and strengthening 
the responsibilities of workers and their families were discussed. However, 
the Korean government is reportedly asking for concrete results in terms of a 
reduction in the desertion rate of Vietnamese workers in Korea. As of March 
2013, the Korea-Vietnam MOU, which expired in August 2012, had not been 
renewed. 
 
3.3.  The case of Japan 
3.3.1. From the ITP/TIP to the new Technical Intern Training Program 
(TITP) 
Japan started the ITP (supervising organization type) in 1990 and 
the TIP in 1993. These programs officially aim at developing human 
resources that contribute to industrial development in developing countries 
through transferring Japanese industrial and professional knowledge, skills, 
and technical expertise. However, criticisms similar to the ones raised about 
the Korean Industrial Trainee Program have been applied to these programs. 
In reality, “trainees” were often treated simply as low-skilled laborers, who 
were nevertheless not entitled to legal labor rights, including the minimum 
wage. Even in the case of technical interns who were officially entitled to 
legal labor rights, violations of labor and human rights such as 
underpayment and confiscation of passports or bankbooks abounded.  
The 2009 amendment to the Immigration Control and Refugee 
Recognition Act replaced the ITP/TIP with the TITP, which took effect on 
July 1, 2010. Under the TITP, provisions of labor-related laws and 
regulations are to be applied to foreign workers (technical intern trainees: 
TITs) from the first year of their stay in Japan. In addition, the TITP 
prohibits sending organizations from collecting deposits from TITs or their 
families and relatives. Deposits are generally collected to prevent workers 
from breaking contracts. However, in practice, the deposits tend to increase 
the economic burden on workers, and, thus, make it difficult for workers to 
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assert their rights out of fear of losing the deposits, or, somewhat 
paradoxically, add to the incentive for workers to engage in illegal work. The 
prohibition of deposits is thus (in part) aimed at dealing with the problem of 
TIT desertions. 
As in the case of Korea, the Japanese ITP/TIP was revised to improve 
the protection of foreign workers’ rights, but the scope of the revision was 
limited. Above all, although TITs are treated as workers in terms of basic 
labor rights, the workers are not regarded as foreign workers as such. In 
addition, there are questions about whether implementation of the revised 
provisions will be effectively enforced. Whether a worker pays a deposit is 
verified by checking the contract at the immigration inspection; if a sending 
agency is found to have violated the ban, the agency will be suspended from 
sending TITs to Japan for a certain period. However, a deposit may not be 
the only item responsible for inflating pre-departure costs, and preventing 
sending agencies from levying deposits in other disguised forms would be 
difficult.  
In any case, the new TITP has not been implemented long enough to 
assess the impact of the system revision. In this paper, therefore, the TITP is 
basically treated as an extension of the ITP/TIP (the TITP and ITP/TIP are 
called “trainee programs” for short). 
 
3.3.2. Sending and receiving Vietnamese trainees and the problem of 
runaway workers 
 JITCO signed the first Record of Discussion (R/D) with MOLISA in 
1992; the R/D was revised in 2010 to reflect the changes in the TIP/ITP. 
JITCO holds annual meetings with MOLISA to exchange information and 
views on outstanding issues related to implementation of the trainee 
program and seek solutions to problems. In these meetings, JITCO 
repeatedly called MOLISA’s attention to the problem of worker desertion and 
requested the latter take effective measures to deal with the problem 
(especially providing support to returning workers in finding jobs).  
 JITCO conducted a survey on the background of the desertion 
problem of Vietnamese trainees at the end of the 1990s (Asami [2000]). At 
that time, the desertion rate of Vietnamese trainees was about 7%, which 
was much higher than that of trainees from other countries. The survey 
found that high pre-departure costs and the prevalent unemployment among 
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returning trainees were possible main factors affecting the high desertion 
rate.  
 One of the requirements for a trainee is that he or she should be 
scheduled for employment that requires the technical skills acquired in 
Japan after he or she returns to his or her home country. In other words, the 
trainee program assumes that trainees are selected from incumbent workers 
of enterprises (“sending enterprises”), and after completing training in Japan, 
the workers return to their original workplace. However, these assumptions 
do not always match reality. 
 When interviewed about trainee recruitment, sending agencies may 
say that they first identify enterprises likely to have employees suited to the 
conditions set by Japanese employers and then ask these enterprises to 
recommend suitable candidates. This is in line with the JITCO guideline for 
sending agencies. However, in reality, sending agencies may ask vocational 
training schools or employment introduction centers to recommend 
candidates, or enterprises may recommend candidates who are not 
employees.  
Asami presumed that it would be rational for sending agencies to 
select candidates from unemployed or poorly paid workers rather than 
employees of established enterprises who are relatively well-paid, provided 
that the sending agencies want to maximize kickbacks from the workers. 
Furthermore, a special feature of the Vietnamese economic structure makes 
it difficult for sending agencies to follow JITCO guidelines. In Vietnam, 
where the domestic private sector is not yet fully developed, potential 
sending enterprises are limited to inefficient state-owned enterprises 
suffering from surplus labor or small private enterprises whose employees 
are mainly short-term contract workers with frequent turnover. In either 
case, it would be difficult to expect these enterprises to re-employ the 
returnees and use their acquired skills. Asami proposed as one possible 
solution that the Japanese government create a framework to enable 
returned trainees to use their skills on the assumption that they would not 
return to their original workplace (Asami [2000, 20]).  
At the government level, no substantive measures for specifically 
dealing with the problem of Vietnamese runaway workers in Japan have 
been taken on either side, however. The JITCO guidelines for trainee 
recruitment are actually flexible, and sending agencies are given discretion 
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to adapt their recruitment methods to countries’ situations. On the 
Vietnamese side, according to MOLISA figures, the Vietnamese trainees’ 
desertion rate in Japan is about 2%,18 which may explain why MOLISA has 
not taken any specific measures to address the problem.  
It is noted, however, a group of new-type sending agencies have 
emerged and have been growing in recent years, which provides a model of 
good practice in sending workers. Take Company E (established in 2005), for 
example. The company has unique characteristics: It emphasizes 
pre-departure training in Japanese and other subjects such as Japanese 
corporate culture and career planning. The agency makes it a rule to directly 
involve the Japanese receiving company and supervising organization in 
selecting trainees from candidates who completed the basic training. The 
company’s finances do not depend on fees from potential migrant workers. 
The company also introduces returned trainees to Japanese enterprises in 
Vietnam. The number of Vietnamese workers trained at the company’s 
Japanese language school and sent to Japan exceeded 2,000 by May 2012. 
According to the company’s management, the desertion rate is low among 
trainees trained at the school.19 
Although the emergence of sending agencies such as Company E is 
certainly a positive development, it has not affected the overall runaway 
trainee situation. The desertion rate for Vietnamese trainees recently stood 
at about the same or a slightly higher level than in the late 1990s. Asked 
about the employment situation after returning to Vietnam, about 80% (51 
persons) of the 65 Vietnamese respondents to the JITCO follow-up survey of 
trainees who had returned to their home countries in 2008 answered that 
they were unemployed and looking for a job (compared with 22% of former 
Chinese trainees and 45% of former Indonesian trainees).  
 
3.4. Supplementary information 
 In Korea and Japan, worker recruitment was not conducted in line 
with the intention of the receiving countries’ policies, which seems to have 
                                                   
18 The gap between the Vietnamese and Japanese figures may be explained by the fact 
that Japanese data is limited to JITCO-supported trainees. 
19 Company E is supported by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in 
constructing the school building and expanding the company, as the company’s activities 
are recognized as contributing to developing industrial human resources in Vietnam 
and to enhancing economic cooperation between Vietnam and Japan.  
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become a cause of the high worker desertion rate. In the case of Korea, which 
has adopted a “government-to-government” system in sending/receiving 
migrant workers, the government has got Vietnamese implementation 
mechanisms modified through bilateral negotiations. In the case of Japan, 
where sending and receiving migrant workers are primarily done by private 
actors, although no explicit measures were taken by the Japanese or 
Vietnamese governments, a new type of sending agencies emerged by a kind 
of “market force,” and their services are more in line with the intention of the 
program.  
 Although these developments are positive, their impact is not yet 
visible in terms of the desertion rate. Then the question is: Is there any 
chance that the Vietnamese worker desertion situation will improve in the 
future? We investigate whether a qualitative impact has been observed. 
 A newspaper article in October 2012 reported the story of a former 
local government official who stopped acting as a broker sending workers to 
Korea when the pre-test at the local level was abolished. This former local 
government official then set up a company and acted as a broker sending 
workers to Japan. According to him, Japanese enterprises generally use 
three methods to select trainees: direct selection, online selection, and 
selection by delegation to sending agencies. Brokers can most easily 
influence the selection process in the third case, but even in the case of direct 
selection, a broker may influence the selection process such as bribing the 
interpreter.20  
 Another article in February 2013 revealed that recently a 
Vietnamese sending agency offered to pay a higher brokerage fee than the 
level set by Vietnamese regulations to a Japanese supervising organization 
receiving Vietnamese trainees if the Japanese organization received trainees 
through the agency. The article also quoted the president of a major sending 
agency as saying that he was asked by some of his company’s Japanese 
partners to raise the brokerage fee as other sending agencies did.21 
 Labor migration to Korea does not seem to be free from illegal 
brokerage, either. In May 2010, the Hanoi police arrested the chief 
accountant of the OWC and revealed organized acts of fraud such as 
                                                   
20 “Labor export brokerage: relentless ‘octopus tentacles’”, Tuoi Tre News, 24 October 
2012. 
21 “Bat nhao phi moi gioi xuat khau lao dong (Confusion over labor export brokerage 
fee)”, Tuoi Tre, 19 February 2013. 
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providing some applicants with answers in the EPS-TOPIK. At the end of 
2011, an allegation was reported that an official of the employment 
introduction center of Nam Dinh province received US$6,000 from the family 
of a worker who had hoped to go to Korea to work. This case was made public 
because the worker failed to go to Korea despite paying the unofficial 
“brokerage fee.”  
 Undoubtedly, various individuals and organizations continue to 
engage in brokerage services and charge high commissions to workers 
involved in labor migration to Japan and Korea. In Japan’s case, whether 
trainee recruitment is conducted legally depends largely on the choice by 
receiving company and supervising organization of sending agencies and the 
mode of recruitment. However, anecdotal evidence suggests this “market” 
may not necessarily lead to driving out bad companies. On the other hand, 
although cases (or allegations) of fraud involved in recruiting workers to 
work in Korea have been reported, the fact that these cases came to the 
surface can be seen as a sign of the increasing difficulty brokers have dealing 
with labor migration to Korea.  
 Recently, DOLAB has emphasized through the mass media that the 
process for sending workers to Korea is so strict that no individual or 
organization can intervene, and has warned workers to be alert for swindlers 
pretending to be brokers. If or when such a notion prevails, the room for 
illegal brokerage services could narrow further. In addition, disseminating 
more information and simplifying the procedures related to labor export 
would help reduce the advantages brokers tend to have over rural workers.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
Labor export in Vietnam has developed steadily in the last 20 years. 
However, recent surveys and newspaper reports have revealed that the 
workers themselves are not getting as much benefit from labor export as 
expected. Due to the high pre-departure costs, combined with the frequent 
occurrence of early returns in some receiving countries in particular, not a 
small portion of migrant workers reportedly cannot finish repaying the debts 
before returning to Vietnam.22 In some parts of the country, communities 
called “Korea village” or “Taiwan village” or something similar have popped 
                                                   
22 According to Belanger et al. [2010, 54], up to one in three workers had not finished 
paying back their debt before returning home. 
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up, which have ties with these countries through labor migration flows. In 
such villages, many new houses are built, and various shops set up, thus 
demonstrating prosperity in the middle of poor rural areas. However, in 
reality, returnees are often unemployed, only hoping for another chance to go 
abroad to work. The high desertion rate among Vietnamese workers reflects 
this situation. 
Although in practice the background of desertion is highly complex, 
involving individual, environmental, and institutional factors in the sending 
and receiving countries, this paper mainly concentrated on issues of illegal 
brokerage and high pre-departure costs and unemployment of returnees. 
From the Korean and Japanese cases we have examined, we see getting rid 
of illegal brokerage in the labor sending process is difficult. However, 
systematic efforts to remove such acts may not be completely ineffective. 
Indeed, the implementation of the Korean EPS is showing some signs of 
change in the practice of sending workers. Whether it can actually lead to 
reducing the problem of Vietnamese runaway workers by combining 
measures such as ensuring a high level of transparency in the worker 
recruitment process, disseminating accurate information, and supporting 
returnees in securing employment, we will need to see.  
In the case of Japan, although the desertion level is relatively low, 
the current rather “flexible” approach that leaves much to the decision of 
concerned enterprises would not guarantee a change in the right direction. 
More sustained and systematic efforts are needed to detect the specific 
background of the problem and deal with it.  
The Vietnamese government, for its part, has much to do to improve 
the complex and obscure labor export system, in cooperation with receiving 
country governments. For instance, although there are organizations such as 
DOLAB, OWC, and MRC, it is not easy just to get a list of licensed sending 
agencies from websites of these organizations. We also need to see whether 
evaluating sending agencies based on the CoC developed by VAMAS would 
help in shaping up the “labor export industry” and provide guidance for 
selecting good sending agencies. Trying to solve the problem of desertion 
primarily by imposing more burdens on workers and their families would be 
neither effective nor justifiable.  
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